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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is a humbling experience to read the jurisprudence of the Ohio Supreme Court 
over a 200-year period, and to recognize that the small contributions our generation 
makes are but small decorations on top of an edifice that was built by giants. Our 
Supreme Court has had the benefit of some towering figures in the past, among an 
occasional scoundrel or two, but the court has made significant contributions to 
American tort law.2 We who teach in the tort law field recognize Ohio’s very 
substantial contribution to the evolving jurisprudence of tort law.3 When the Ohio 
Supreme Court speaks on controversial issues in tort law, others listen.4 But when 
                                                                
1Visiting Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati.  
2See, e.g., Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958) 
(abolishing privity requirements); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Co., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 
N.E.2d 185 (1966) (implied warranty in tort); Temple v. Wean United Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 
317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977) (adopting strict liability). 
3Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 83 Ohio St. 3d 507, 511, 700 N.E.2d 1247, 1251 
(1998) (failure to include safety features); Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 52 Ohio St. 3d 251, 
257, 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1182 (1990) (duty to warn of known danger).  
4For example, the central concept of defective design is frequently illustrated by cases 
such as Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814 (1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982), on remand, No. C.A. L-84-125, 1987 WL 6486 (Ohio Ct. App. 
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our court today speaks so harshly and so inconsistently about tort policies, others 
may mourn the loss of our state’s stare decisis principles in tort jurisprudence. 
This paper will try to address the court’s present and future course in tort law, 
with particular focus on products liability, malpractice, and employer tort liability. 
These are the most intriguing segments of modern tort law in Ohio. The paper 
concludes that stare decisis and the precedential accretion of the common law no 
longer seem to matter to the Ohio Supreme Court. Instead, the cacophony of a 
fractured court has imperiled predictability and imperiled the court’s national 
reputation.  Instead, the topic of a prospective justice’s view of the tort system is 
unfortunately an early and frequent conversation in recruitment, selection, and 
funding of the candidates for the court. While tort law justice is not for sale in Ohio, 
its trends can be heavily influenced by the pervasive expense structure of supreme 
court electoral politics. Contrary to what television attack ads have claimed, justices’ 
individual votes are not for sale, but their policy outcomes can perhaps be more 
closely predicted as a result of the forces that control campaign finance in Ohio 
judicial elections. 
II.  POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE COURT’S TORT VIEWS 
A careful analysis of Ohio Supreme Court elections demonstrates that elections 
are substantially affected by the consequences of the tort liability and malpractice 
cases on the court’s docket. The term “products liability” does not appear anywhere 
in the Ohio Constitution, but it is talked about regularly among substantial donors 
and throughout the news media. The public is aware of damage lawsuits against 
product and service providers, and the tales of judicial largesse become legendary—
like the $2.7 million verdict, now an urban legend, for a scalding by McDonalds’ 
coffee.5 For better or worse, liability law themes sharpen the focus on what the 
prospective new member of the court can be expected to do as her or his contribution 
to society, in return for a segment of society’s contributions to her or him as 
candidates.  
The selection of “electable” candidates in the Ohio political party system will 
inevitably involve the attitudes and beliefs of the candidates about the issues of 
greatest interest to political donors, especially liability issues. The stance of Ohio 
Supreme Court candidates on product and medical liability is a theme that is talked 
about as exhibit A in the biennial political party meetings to select candidates for the 
court. In a similar vein, medical malpractice decisions of the court are exhibit B, and 
these discussions with candidates who become justices can carry enormous 
consequences for the representatives of insurers, litigation attorneys, hospitals, 
manufacturers, nurses, and physicians. These pre-election meetings occur within the 
party ranks but are rarely scrutinized from the outside. Candidates later appear before 
the microphones with a campaign war chest but no overt explanation for their 
selection. Even with the recent easing of judicial candidates’ freedom to discuss 
                                                          
Feb. 9, 1987). The recent gun maker liability opinion drew widespread notice, Cincinnati v. 
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St. 3d 416, 768 N.E.2d 1136 (2002).  See, e.g., 
http://www.facworld.com/ facworld.nsf/ doc/gun1000litig. 
5Stella Liebeck was awarded $2.7 million in punitive damages against the restaurant chain 
McDonalds.  The eventual payout was believed to be much lower.  Actual Facts About the 
McDonalds Case, Electric Law Library, at http://www.lectlaw.com/ files/cur78.html. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/14
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issues,6 tort law and funding is a connection that seems best left unstated. Beyond the 
view of the media, the handlers behind the candidates will unabashedly invoke 
liability law as a sparkplug to raise funds for judicial candidates for the court. The 
candidates’ positions on medical liability are invoked when one wants to achieve a 
rise in contributions from an affected medical group or a trial attorney organization. 
This is the rarely discussed underside of judicial elections, but it is Ohio’s reality. 
The fiscal background of this process is remarkable: About two dollars were 
spent for every vote the winners received in the 2002 election. A new justice begins 
a six-year term with the knowledge that a $758,000 reelection fund was needed for 
the fellow justice who retained her seat in 2002.7 Raising an average of $10,500 in 
contributions each month for six years will fund the actual cost of one recent 
reelection campaign.8 One incumbent justice raised 85% of his funds from business 
groups, according to a watchdog website’s analysis of donor identities.9 About 1.6 
million voters statewide voted for one or both of the winning candidates for the Ohio 
Supreme Court in 2002.10 The four interest groups that worked hardest on the 
advertising for that campaign spent more than $1.6 million,11 while the two winning 
candidates spent another $1.6 million that they raised themselves.12 The result was a 
Republican victory for both seats that cost the winners and their allies about two 
dollars per voter. When the losing Democratic candidates’ expenditures are counted, 
the total cost of airtime for broadcast ads for the two supreme court seats was 
$4,833,786,13 making 2002 one of the most expensive races in Ohio Supreme Court 
history. The 2002 Republican winners become two of seven justices on a court with 
a recent history of 4-3 voting patterns. 
III.  A PERSONAL DISCLAIMER 
Before this paper enters the academic analysis of tort jurisprudence, the author 
explains why the paper offers a little more skeptical perspective than other professors 
might present. Before entering full-time academic life, I was a member of the 
candidate selection subcommittee of the corporate political action committee of one 
                                                                
6Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 




8Of course, the actual fundraising is done within the final 12-15 months of the justice’s 
term and is done via surrogates. 
9Ohio Citizen, at http://www.opensecrets.org/oh/gets/st/index/4.html (Justice Pfeifer). 
10Ohio Secretary of State, Official Election Results, at http://www.state.oh.us/sos/ 
2002General/2002GenResults.html. 
11Brennan Center for Justice, NYU, Press Release, More State Supreme Court Races 
Include Advertising; More Advertising by Interest Groups (Nov. 6, 2002). 
12Ohio Secretary of State, Candidate Filings for Maureen O’Connor and Evelyn Stratton, 
at http://www.state.oh.us/sos/2002General/02GenSupCrt2.html. 
13Brennan Center for Justice, NYU, Buying Time 2002: Television Advertising in State 
Supreme Court Elections (2002). 
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of Ohio’s largest corporations. That PAC gave substantial funds to candidates, over 
$200,000 last year.14 So I have the experience of having met justices and would-be 
justices in their “lean and hungry” mode, and I have contributed hundreds of dollars 
of my own money to some of their campaigns. Did it buy me anything? No—nor 
would I expect it to.  Does the PAC contribution swing votes? Probably not, but the 
$10,500-per-month cost of reelection is a constant reminder that the justice who 
seeks to retain a place on the court will be soliciting funds from PACs and donors in 
the future.  
I also have an odd perspective on the legislature’s role in justice matters, for our 
former governor once asked me to run for the state legislature, to secure a vulnerable 
seat. I chose instead to stay in the classroom, but my visit to the State House 
included sitting in the ninety-ninth chair in the far back of the general assembly. I 
wondered how the pressures would feel as the occupant of that seat worried about 
reelection. For a junior member of the legislature, the local issues matter, political 
fundraising matters, party allegiance is important, and pressures of timing and 
workload for this part-time job can be pretty significant.  
Some questions would present themselves to any new member of the 
legislature—who, with term limits, is probably a newcomer to the Columbus power 
structure. Would such a legislator feel subordinate to the elected justices’ views on 
an issue of public controversy like limitations on tort damages?  Probably not.  In a 
state where the supreme court’s former building was taken over and remodeled into 
offices for the state senate, and where funding for renovation of a new supreme court 
building is slowly progressing, will the court be a welcomed supplicant to the very 
legislature that it has so harshly scolded?  Is there ample evidence15 of an inter-
branch rivalry in which tort issues are entangled? Certainly. Does the tension of 
checks and balances affect the quality of the jurisprudence on tort issues in Ohio? It 
certainly does. Is the tort issue a prism through which to view the court’s next decade 
of challenges? I think it is. With those caveats, our analysis proceeds. 
IV.  THE APRIL 2003 TORT LEGISLATION 
Let’s consider how the Ohio Supreme Court’s view of torts looks from the 
drafting table of the State House. A few days ago, on April 11, 2003, a new statute 
went into effect16 which squarely faces the dilemma of constitutional views 
expressed by the Ohio Supreme Court concerning the due-process and the access-to-
courts language of the Ohio Constitution.17  
The Ohio Legislature has been engaged in a bizarre form of institutional dialogue 
with the Ohio Supreme Court, through the preamble clauses to legislation, responded 
to with the justices’ return volleys in plurality and dissenting court opinions. It is not 
                                                                
14Procter & Gamble Good Government Committee, at http://herndon1.sdrdc.com/cgi-
bin/fecgifpdf/?_9053+23990119204.pdf. 
15See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 
715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999), reconsideration denied, 87 Ohio St. 3d 1409, 716 N.E.2d 1170 
(1999). 
16Act of Dec. 10, 2002 (effective Apr. 11, 2003), S.B. 281, § 3, 2002 Ohio Legis. Serv. at 
L-3280 (Banks-Baldwin). 
17OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. 
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surprising that the court hired its own lobbyist from the Ohio House minority staff in 
August 2002.18  In this most recent statute, the legislature is amending tort liability in 
several ways that run directly contrary to the prior 4-3 pronouncements of the 
supreme court. In the new tort law that went into effect on April 11, the preface 
includes the legislature’s unusually deferential and even pleading message to the 
court, in the introductory section of the new statute, as follows:19 
The Ohio General Assembly respectfully requests the Ohio Supreme 
Court to uphold this intent in the courts of Ohio, to reconsider its holding 
on damage caps in [Sheward],20 to reconsider its holding on the 
deductibility of collateral source benefits in [Sorrel],21 and to reconsider 
its holding on statutes of repose in [Sedar],22 thereby providing health care 
practitioners with access to affordable medical malpractice insurance and 
maintaining the provision of quality health care in Ohio. 
In the preamble to its new statute, the legislature quoted from Alaska and 
Delaware appellate opinions, federal agency studies, laws in other states, and 
miscellaneous other resource materials. And then, beseeching the court for mercy, 
the legislators offered a limited salute to the court’s constitutional autonomy: 
The General Assembly acknowledges the Court's authority in prescribing 
rules governing practice and procedure in the courts of this state as 
provided in Section 5 of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. 23 
The anticipation of yet another harsh rebuke from the court, that the legislature 
cannot tell the court how to govern tort-related court procedures, probably led to this 
“acknowledgement.” The very odd form of signaling that this message represents 
may seem alien to observers in other states where judges are selected on merit. The 
depth of antipathy can best be appreciated by study of the even worse dialogue in the 
Ohio school funding case, a hot potato passed back and forth from court to 
legislature over more than a dozen years.24  
                                                                
18Ohio Supreme Court Communications Office, Court Hires Legislative Counsel (Aug. 
22, 2002). 
19Act of Dec. 10, 2002, S.B. 281, § 3(C)(1), 2002 Ohio Legis. Serv. at L-3282 (Banks-
Baldwin). 
20State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 715 
N.E.2d 1062 (1999). 
21Sorrel v. Thevenir, 69 Ohio St. 3d 415, 633 N.E.2d 504 (1994). 
22Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co., 49 Ohio St. 3d 193, 551 N.E.2d 938 (1990), overruled 
by Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 70 Ohio St. 3d 460, 639 N.E.2d 425 (1994). 
23Act of Dec. 10, 2002, S.B. 281, § 3(C)(2), 2002 Ohio Legis. Serv. at L-3282 (Banks-
Baldwin). 
24DeRolph v. State, 79 Ohio St. 3d 297, 681 N.E.2d 424 (1997). 
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V.  THE OHIO CONSTITUTION’S ACCESS TO COURTS CLAUSE 
The Ohio Constitution provides in Article I, Section 16 for access to the courts 
and for remedies by “due course of law,” our state’s constitutional equivalent of the 
federal due process concept: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his 
land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.25 
The roots of the first sentence of this section are traceable to the original 1802 
Ohio Constitution.26  The original provision expanded on part of the Northwest 
Ordinance, which stated that the citizens of the Northwest Territory “shall always be 
entitled to the benefits of . . . judicial proceedings according to the course of the 
common law.”27 Even further back are its roots in chapter 40 of Magna Carta in 
1215, which inspired Ohio’s right-to-a-remedy clause and similar clauses in thirty-
nine state constitutions. Courts were corruptly selling writs to the rich and powerful, 
and access to impartial courts was a very serious issue. This aspect of Magna Carta 
had been incorporated into the colonies’ charters of rights at the time of the 
American Revolution.28  
During that same period the federal Bill of Rights29 was being adopted, which 
protects the right to petition government for redress of grievances. So the Ohio 
language is in part analogous to the Due Process Clause in the contemporaneous 
federal Fifth Amendment,30 and the due process and equal protection guarantees in 
the much later Fourteenth Amendment.31 In part it goes farther, since the U.S. 
Constitution does not have a comparable court access clause. 
As the official commentary on the Ohio Constitution has observed, the open 
courts clause “has been construed to require public court proceedings, absent the 
necessity for closed proceedings to protect some overriding interest or insure the 
orderly administration of justice.”32 Beyond simple access, the right-to-a-remedy 
clause has spawned a wide variety of cases involving claims of deprivation of a 
remedy for injuries to property, person, or reputation.33 Likewise, Ohio’s due process 
                                                                
25OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. 
26OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 7. 
27NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, art. II, § 14 (1787). 
28Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts 
Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OREGON L. REV. 1279 (1995). 
29U.S. CONST. amend. I-X. 
30U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
31U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
32Banks-Baldwin commentary to OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16 (citing State ex rel. The 
Repository v. Unger, 28 Ohio St. 3d 418, 504 N.E.2d 37 (1986); E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 
100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (Cuyahoga Cty. 1955)). 
33See, e.g., Leiberg v. Vitangeli, 70 Ohio App. 479, 47 N.E.2d 235 (Stark Cty. 1942) 
(giving aliens access to courts); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 
N.E.2d 334 (1949) (allowing newborn child to sue for injuries suffered in mother's womb). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/14
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guarantee has been invoked in a variety of cases, the basic thrust of the clause being 
a requirement for notice and an opportunity for a fair hearing.34 Due process analysis 
under this section is frequently coupled with equal protection analysis under the 
Ohio Constitution.35 And the Ohio Supreme Court sometimes uses the access-to-
courts clause36 together with the right-to-a-jury clause37 when it looks to state 
constitutional bases for attack on such tort reform legislation. 
When the Ohio Supreme Court’s 4-3 majority blasted the Ohio General 
Assembly in the 1999 Sheward decision,38 harshly reaming the legislature with 
strident tones, the court stated that in enacting its tort reform legislation, the general 
assembly refused to recognize cases that had held that the legislature was 
constitutionally precluded from depriving a claimant of a right to a remedy before 
the claimant knew or should have known of an injury.39 The legislature attempted to 
overrule judicial declarations of unconstitutionality,40 but this was said to violate the 
separation of powers since the legislative branch does not have the final say as to the 
meaning of the constitution—the judiciary does.41 
VI.  OHIO AND TORT LAW EVOLVE TOGETHER 
For those constitutional scholars who are truly originalists, the early decisions of 
the courts offer little illumination about intent. The Ohio Supreme Court in volume 
two of Ohio Reports gave us the first reported appellate decision in torts. The 
steamboat collision litigation of Case & Davis v. Mark42 in 1825 involved two 
Cincinnati famous names, argued by the lawyer for whom downtown Cincinnati’s 
Piatt Park is named and decided by Justice Burnet for whom Burnet Woods in 
Cincinnati was named. The opinion dealt with what we today would call negligence 
and remedies; it differentiated the forms of action for trespass on the case and found 
that causation could be deemed to be direct where a steamboat captain had allowed 
his boat to collide with and sink the plaintiff’s boat.  The court focused upon 
damages, causation, and forms of action long before the legislature entered the tort 
remedy field.  
The court has come a long way since then, and it is no longer the sole determiner 
of tort policy. Inevitable tension arises when an appellate court’s common law 
powers to articulate new “law” of Ohio collide with the Ohio Legislature’s power to 
                                                                
34See, e.g., Ohio Valley Radiology Associates, Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hospital Ass’n, 28 
Ohio St. 3d 118, 502 N.E.2d 599 (1986). 
35OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2.  See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Corp. v. Lindley, 54 Ohio St. 2d 1, 
374 N.E.2d 400 (1978). 
36OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. 
37OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5. 
38Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999). 
39Id. at 476, 715 N.E.2d at 1085. 
40Id. at 492, 715 N.E.2d at 1096. 
41Id. at 493, 715 N.E.2d at 1097. 
422 Ohio St. 169 (1825). 
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define what rights the law should provide for injured persons. Political scientists of 
the future will find this a case study of fractious inter-branch rivalry. 
This paper will now turn to several contemporary issues in tort law that have 
affected the Ohio Supreme Court and are likely to be prominently featured in its 
future evolution. Selecting these themes does not infer peaceful acceptance of the 
court majority’s views in other fields, but simply reflects one view of the hot button 
tort issues. 
VII.  PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The due process guarantee in the Ohio Constitution, unlike its federal 
counterpart, is immediately followed by a right of access to the state’s courts.43 So 
the linkage between a civil tort plaintiff’s access to remedial relief and the Ohio 
doctrine of due process is very close. The ability to recoup compensatory damages is 
important for victims of bad products or bad physicians; the ability to deter such bad 
conduct by various means is important for society at large. Punitive damage awards 
are a controversial method of deterring and punishing malpractice and errant 
product-designer choices.44  The legislature responded with a set of punitive damage 
constraints that were then struck down by the Ohio Supreme Court in the 1999 
Sheward45 decision. 
By what ratio can a punitive damage award exceed actual damages, before it 
violates the due process rights of the defendant? The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 
April 7, 2003 decision limiting punitive damage awards in the State Farm case46 
placed a presumptive limitation of “single digit multipliers” (i.e., no more than nine 
times actual damages) on future federal product liability awards of punitive damages. 
That decision makes for a useful contrast with the December 2002 Ohio Dardinger 
decision,47 since both courts spoke of due process considerations in civil tort 
litigation concerning punitive damages.48 Compared to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 9:1 
presumptive acceptability range in State Farm, the Ohio Supreme Court allowed a 
                                                                
43OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. 
44Opponents of punitive damages, whose proposals range from damage caps or restrictive 
formulae to outright elimination, describe punitive damages as an unruly doctrinal foundling, 
capable of outrageous and wanton excess, and incapable of placement in any traditional tort 
structure. The distillate of such arguments is that “unmediated punitive damages have no ad 
valoram effect in accident law, serve no progressive contemporary tort objective, preserve the 
specter of ungoverned overdeterrence, and ‘appear to be an anomaly, a hybrid in search of a 
rationale.’" M. Stuart Madden, Renegade Conduct and Punitive Damages in Tort, 53 S.C. L. 
REV. 1175 (2002). 
45Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 483, 715 N.E.2d at 1090. 
46State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003). 
47Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St. 3d 77, 781 N.E.2d 121 
(2002). 
48State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1519-20 (citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 562 (1996) and Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 
424, 433 (2001)). 
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large multiplier (49:1) in Dardinger and a larger number (100:1) in Williams,49 while 
accepting a 6,250:1 punitive/actual multiplier in Wightman.50 When the legislature 
selected a 3:1 ratio, the Ohio Supreme Court rebuked it in Sheward.51 The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s view trumps that of the Ohio Supreme Court as to the due process 
constitutionality threshold on federal issues, and since it reversed the Utah Supreme 
Court when it decided State Farm, it arguably overrode state due process views of 
courts like the Ohio Supreme Court as well. 
In Dardinger,52 a 4-3 decision that probably drew hot debate within the court’s 
chambers before its issuance, Justice Paul Pfeifer, formerly one of the most powerful 
members of the Ohio Senate before receiving the court nomination as a Republican 
in 1992, waxed eloquent in criticizing a health maintenance organization’s internal 
bureaucracy that dawdled while a patient was denied experimental medical 
treatment. The lyrical rhetoric builds to a crescendo rarely seen in bland appellate 
prose: 
Here, the tragedy evolved over months, while Anthem and AICI watched. 
They created hope, then snatched it away. They took a dignified death 
from Esther Dardinger and filled her last days with frustration, doubt, and 
desperation. And every minute of additional pain suffered by Esther 
Dardinger was a natural outgrowth of the defendants' practiced 
powerlessness, their active inactivity.53 
Quoting from the classic movie Casablanca and other sources, the majority 
opinion noted that legislatures divide punitive damages in some states but that in 
Ohio it was solely the role of the four justices in the majority to allocate the funds: 
There is a philosophical void between the reasons we award punitive 
damages and how the damages are distributed. The community makes the 
statement, while the plaintiff reaps the monetary award. Numerous states 
have formalized through legislation a mechanical means to divide a 
punitive damages award between the plaintiff and the state. In some 
states, the state’s portion goes to a special fund, in others, to the general 
fund. In Ohio, punitive damages are an outgrowth of the common law. 
Therefore, Ohio’s courts have a central role to play in the distribution of 
punitive damages. Punitive damages awards should not be subject to 
                                                                
49Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St. 3d 464, 479-480, 700 N.E.2d 859, 870-871 
(1998). 
50Wightman v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 86 Ohio St. 3d 431, 438, 715 N.E.2d 546, 552-53 
(1999). 
51
“[T]he General Assembly has in effect found that any punitive damage award in excess 
of the greater of three times the amount of compensatory damages or $250,000 is 
unconstitutional. This finding contravenes our decision in Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., [83 
Ohio St. 3d 464, 479-80, 700 N.E.2d 859, 870-71 (1998),] where we upheld the 
constitutionality of an award for $15,000 in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in 
punitive damages.” Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 485, 715 N.E.2d at 1091. 
52Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St. 3d 77, 781 N.E.2d 121 
(2002). 
53Id. at 98, 781 N.E.2d at 140. 
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bright-line division but instead should be considered on a case-by-case 
basis, with those awards making the most significant societal statements 
being the most likely candidates for alternative distribution.54 
The author of the majority opinion, Justice Paul Pfeifer, subsequently explained 
his position in a weekly website column, in which he again excoriated the 
defendant.55  The supreme court’s majority took a very controversial left turn from 
prior law and followed Pfeifer into uncharted territory. According to critics of the 
court’s 4-3 majority, the justices commandeered the cash from the jury award56 by 
creating a nonstatutory distribution of their own imaginative creation: 
The final net amount remaining after the prescribed payments should go 
to a place that will achieve a societal good, a good that can rationally 
offset the harm done by the defendants in this case. Due to the societal 
stake in the punitive damages award, we find it most appropriate that it go 
to a state institution. In this case we order that the corpus of the punitive 
damages award go to a cancer research fund, to be called the Esther 
Dardinger Fund, at the James Cancer Hospital and Solove Research 
Institute at the Ohio State University.57 
The concept of cy pres is recognized in equity, seeking to reach the testator’s 
intent by giving funds to a donee whose purposes most nearly approximate those of 
the testamentary gift whose donee is unavailable.58 But this was a $20 million twist 
in a case involving not equity but common law remedial allocation of awards:  Here 
a most reluctant donor is being forced to pay a huge sum to an unsuspecting charity 
which (presumably) had not campaigned for the gift. Ironically, the plaintiff had 
expected to make a much smaller gift in memory of his late wife, to another 
institution,59 before the four justices bestowed tens of millions of dollars on their 
local hospital in Columbus.  
Before your law school foundation director begins to salivate at the thought of a 
future court award that redirects money to Cleveland-Marshall Law School, let’s 
                                                                
54Id. at 104-05, 781 N.E.2d at 145-46. 
55
“[A] punitive damages award is about the defendant's actions—it is meant to punish the 
guilty and deter future misconduct, not enrich the plaintiff. In essence, the jury is determining 
whether and to what extent we as a society should punish the defendant. A punitive damages 
award, then, is a means of the community making a statement.” Weekly Column of Justice 
Pfeifer, at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Communications_Office/Justice_Pfeifer/2003/jp040 
903.asp. (Apr. 2, 2003). 
56An economist’s criticism of the method of reallocation is found in Ralph Frasca, The 
Dardinger Case: An Unconstitutional Taking, Buckeye Institute of Ohio, at 
http://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/Articles/2003_01%20Frasca.html. 
57Dardinger, 98 Ohio St. 3d at 105, 781 N.E.2d at 146. 
58Stark v. Leonard Fuchs Irrevocable Gift Trust, 145 Ohio App. 3d 699, 764 N.E.2d 446 
(2001). 
59Dardinger: Court Ruling Sends a Message, NEWARK ADVOCATE, Dec. 22, 2002. 
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remember that in 2002, Cleveland-Marshall’s only alumnus on the court voted to 
send the defendant’s cash to Ohio State!60 
VIII.  STATUTES OF REPOSE 
The concept of legislation fixing a time after which the risk of liability claims 
would end is well understood in modern tort law. The political consequences of the 
statute of repose are particularly important in a “rust belt” state where many durable 
goods are produced. When the legislature selects a tax depreciation “useful life” 
figure for a type of tax-deductible equipment, it is making a fiscal judgment that is 
noticed only by tax accountants. But when it picks a deadline for lawsuits and allows 
the makers of older machines to escape tort liability, it is making a critical public 
policy choice that aids equipment makers and affects individual workers. These 
hardy machine tools, cranes, punch presses, and tractors from Ohio have long lives 
and probably do not become safer as they get older. A statute of repose that applies 
across the board makes the plaintiff’s claim more difficult, and discourages 
plaintiffs’ attorneys from taking cases, even with catastrophic injuries. Hence the real 
controversy that such laws present is between beneficiaries of competing demands 
for protection. 
It is the legislature’s prerogative to establish terms of liability under statutory 
law, but this power may collide with the “access to courts” protection mentioned 
earlier. The court has varied in its views with the justices’ electorally shifting 
majority. The Ohio Legislature, in the new tort law effective April 11, 2003, has 
begged the Ohio Supreme Court to change its view on statutes of repose.61  
The Court of Appeals in Franklin County attempted to recap the war between the 
legislature and the supreme court in these terms: 
[U]nder appropriate circumstances the General Assembly may supersede 
the prospective application of a Supreme Court decision through its 
general power to make legislative changes. . . .  [A] decision by the 
General Assembly to enact legislation to supersede a Supreme Court 
decision by name is no more an infringement on the power of the 
judiciary than a decision by the Supreme Court to declare a statute 
unconstitutional is an infringement on the power of the General Assembly 
to enact legislation. . . . While the judiciary retains the power to nullify 
legislation that violates constitutional provisions, the judiciary was 
obligated to respect the General Assembly's expression of its 
disagreement with the Supreme Court's interpretation of R.C. 3937.18 in 
Savoie.”62 
                                                                
60Justice Francis Sweeney, who voted with the majority in Dardinger, is a CSU alumnus. 
See http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices/Sweeney. 
61Act of Dec. 10, 2002 (effective Apr. 11, 2003), S.B. 281, § 3(C)(1), 2002 Ohio Legis. 
Serv. at L-3282 (Banks-Baldwin) (asking the court “to reconsider its holding on statutes of 
repose in Sedar v. Knowlton Const. Co., [49 Ohio St. 3d 193, 551 N.E.2d 938 (1990)], thereby 
providing health care practitioners with access to affordable medical malpractice insurance 
and maintaining the provision of quality health care in Ohio”). 
62Webb ex rel. Webb v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 01AP-534, 2001 WL 1340751, at *5-6 
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2001) (Franklin Cty.) (emphasis in original), appeal not allowed, 94 
Ohio St. 3d 1454, 762 N.E.2d 371 (2002).  
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Those are the words of the lower court, not the Ohio Supreme Court. Recent 
decisional outcomes explain why the legislature would beseech the court not to 
overturn its next attempt to impose such a repose. A statute of repose protecting 
architects’ and builders’ services63 was held in 1990 not to violate the due process or 
right-to-a-remedy provisions64 or the equal protection guarantees65 of the Ohio 
Constitution.66 The court held in the 1994 Brennaman decision that the constitution’s 
“right to a judicial remedy” clause requires that plaintiffs have a reasonable period of 
time to enter the courthouse to seek compensation after an accident.67 The court held 
in 1999 that such a legislated “statute of repose” for products liability claims violated 
Ohio’s Constitution.68 In 1987, statutes of repose barring the claims of medical 
malpractice plaintiffs who did not know or could not reasonably have known of their 
injuries were held to violate the access-to-courts provision remedy.69  In the 1999 
Sheward case, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the six-year statute of repose 
governing medical malpractice claims violated that same provision of the 
constitution guaranteeing a right to a remedy.70 
The statute of repose becomes especially problematic when it cuts off a right of 
access to the courts for belatedly discovered toxic effects of chemical exposures. The 
Ohio Supreme Court held in 1993 in Burgess71 that a cause of action for injuries 
resulting from diethylstilbestrol (DES) properly accrues when the claimant either is 
informed by competent medical authority that she has been injured by DES, or when 
she should have known that she has been so injured by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence.72  The legislature’s attempt to cut off DES suits73 by triggering the two-
year period of limitations from the time she learns she may possibly have a DES-
related injury was invalidated as an unconstitutional infringement on the right of 
access to the courts, because it would have compelled the tort claimant to file a 
premature lawsuit which could not survive a motion for summary judgment.74 
What will the court’s new conservative majority do in 2004 in response to the 
April 11 legislation’s extraordinary request for permission to enact a statute of 
                                                                
63OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.131. 
64OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. 
65OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2. 
66Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co., 49 Ohio St. 3d 193, 551 N.E.2d 938 (1990). 
67Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 70 Ohio St. 3d 460, 639 N.E.2d 425 (1994), amended, 71 
Ohio St. 3d 1211, 643 N.E.2d 138 (1994). 
68Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999). 
69Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
1066 (1987). 
70Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999). 
71Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., 66 Ohio St. 3d 59, 609 N.E.2d 140 (1993), answer to 
certified question conformed to 995 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1993). 
7266 Ohio St. 3d at 64, 609 N.E.2d at 143-44. 
73OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.10. 
74Burgess, 66 Ohio St. 3d at 62-63, 609 N.E.2d at 142-43.  
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repose?  Will Sheward’s hostile language toward the legislature survive the shift of 
power inside the court? Will the addition of a very conservative Republican to the 
court majority, while a very conservative Republican majority holds both legislative 
houses and all elected state offices, shift the views of the court to a kinder, gentler 
tone? 
IX.  COLLATERAL BENEFITS 
The tort law’s compensation to a victim sometimes includes jury awards for 
amounts that had already been paid by others—e.g., an award for hospital bills 
already paid by one’s medical insurance. The consideration of these “collateral” 
amounts would diminish the amount of a jury award. The Ohio Supreme Court in 
Sheward rejected the legislature’s effort to impose a reduction on verdicts for 
collateral sources of remedial income. The statute that the court invalidated: 
essentially gathers all evidence of collateral source payments, regardless 
of the category of harm for which it compensates and regardless of 
whether it compensates for past or future losses, tosses it in an 
indiscriminate heap along with all categories and items of compensatory 
damages, and authorizes, out of that, a general verdict replete with 
collateral benefit setoffs. Any prevention of double recovery that may 
result from this morass is fortuitous at best. Indeed, the relation between 
the purported goal of eliminating double recovery and the means 
employed in amended R.C. 2317.45 to achieve it is so attenuated that one 
could conclude that the primary goal of R.C. 2317.45 is simply to reduce 
damages generally. Amended R.C. 2317.45 simply attempts to sidestep 
Sorrell.75 
The Court had decided (in the 1994 Sorrell decision being “sidestepped”) that a 
statute requiring a trial court to deduct from the total jury award any collateral 
benefits received by plaintiff could deny plaintiff any meaningful remedy by 
eliminating the entire jury award.  This statute would hinder the fundamental right of 
victims to obtain recovery for all injuries or damages sustained. Thus the statute was 
held to violate the court access and jury trial clauses of the Ohio Constitution.76  
X.  CAPS ON DAMAGES 
Ohio’s constitutional right to a jury trial77 has been held to include a right to a 
jury determination of the amount of damages.78 Ohio “tort reform” legislation 
                                                                
75Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 482, 715 N.E.2d at 1090. 
76Sorrell v. Thevenir, 69 Ohio St. 3d 415, 633 N.E.2d 504(1994). 
77OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5. 
78
“[T]he right to a jury trial includes the right to have the jury pass on all the factual issues 
in dispute. Miller v. Wikel Mfg. Co., [46 Ohio St. 3d 76, 545 N.E.2d 76 (1989)]. The factual 
issues in dispute include the liability, the dollar amount of the liability, and the finality of that 
amount.”  Richardson v. Board of County Com’rs of Tuscarawas County, No. 95-AP-110114, 
1996 WL 753188, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1996).  Accord Gladon v. Greater Cleveland 
Regional Transit Auth., No. 64029, 1994 WL 78468 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1994) 
(Cuyahoga Cty.), reversed on other grounds, 75 Ohio St. 3d 312, 662 N.E.2d 287 (1996) 
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imposed a cap on the award of damages.79 The court held in Sheward that: “The right 
belongs to the litigant, not the jury, and a statute that allows the jury to determine the 
amount of punitive damages to be awarded but denies the litigant the benefit of that 
determination stands on no better constitutional footing than one that precludes the 
jury from making the determination in the first instance.”80 
Medical malpractice verdicts could be capped by the legislature at a certain fixed 
dollar amount,81 and by doing so the malpractice exposure of medical liability 
insurance carriers could be reduced.82 But the consequence of the cap is that the 
injured patient is less likely to obtain an aggressive contingent fee plaintiff’s attorney 
to pursue the damages request.  
The caps on damages rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court in Sheward will be 
back before the court in a different form under the April 11 legislation. Stare decisis 
may be replaced by a “stare down” confrontation inside the court’s conference room. 
Much as one might love to listen in on that debate among the justices in private 
conference after the new case is argued to the full court, we on the outside can only 
speculate about what they will decide. If electoral trends trump stare decisis, one can 
predict that the new damage caps will be upheld 4-3 or 5-2 by the court, reversing 
Sheward and using the fluid reconstruction of the “access to courts” language as we 
described earlier. The U.S. Senate Democratic Caucus will play a large role in the 
Ohio Supreme Court’s voting pattern, as it holds up the fate of current Justice 
Deborah Cook while the Senate delays the confirmation of several candidates 
including Justice Cook to the federal Sixth Circuit. The replacement appointment 
will undoubtedly be asked whether he or she can reflect the current governor’s views 
of the tort system.83 
XI.  INTENTIONAL TORTS 
The issue of most direct interest to unions is the ability of the injured worker to 
go beyond the small payments available under workers compensation. That system is 
constitutionally based and excludes virtually all civil suits against employers. The 
Ohio Supreme Court’s recognition of “intentional torts” ends exclusivity and is a 
direct economic threat to employers, who of course planned their budgets based on 
                                                          
(featuring a searing attack on the majority by dissenting Justice Andrew Douglas, for the 
majority’s refusal to rule on constitutionality of damages caps). 
79OHIO REV. CODE § 2315.21. 
80Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 484-85, 715 N.E.2d at 1091. 
81OHIO REV. CODE § 2323.43. 
82Act of Dec. 10, 2002, S.B. 281, § 3(A)(3)(b), 2002 Ohio Legis. Serv. at L-3281 (Banks-
Baldwin) (uncodified findings) (“Many medical malpractice insurers left the Ohio market as 
they faced increasing losses, largely as a consequence of rapidly rising compensatory damages 
and noneconomic loss awards in medical malpractice actions. The Department of Insurance 
reports that only six admitted carriers continue to actively write coverage in Ohio at this 
time.”). 
83Governor Robert Taft’s former law firm (Taft Stettinius & Hollister) is one of the 
premier defense firms in appellate medical liability cases.  See, e.g., York v. Mayfield 
Neurological Institute, 133 Ohio App. 3d 777, 729 N.E.2d 1214 (2000). 
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the state constitution’s provision84 that workers compensation payments are the 
exclusive remedy.  
Ohio Supreme Court case law on this end run around the exclusivity doctrine has 
featured a series of attacks and counter-attacks since 1982’s Blankenship decision,85 
with the legislature and the court colliding on numerous occasions.86 In 1999, the 
third Ohio legislative attempt to restrict intentional torts87 was once again held 
unconstitutional by a 4-3 vote.88 The legislative effort to override that decision 
continues. 
XII.  THE COURT’S NEXT DECADE 
Fear of tort law outcomes induces the cash investments by companies and 
individuals that in turn fuels Ohio Supreme Court election campaigns. Elections are 
about winning; parties exist to win elections; parties need candidates, issues, and 
money in the proper proportions. Tort reform and injured victims’ rights are two 
sides of the same complex political issue. Even the law review commentators use 
controversial metaphors of battles of good and evil in describing these conflicts 
within appellate courts.89  
                                                                
84OHIO CONST. art. II, § 35. 
85Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 
572 (1982). 
86The 1995 legislature, in its uncodified statement of legislative intent for OHIO REV. CODE 
§ 2745.01, squarely addressed the court’s prior line of cases, in language that later drew harsh 
responses in Sheward: “The General Assembly hereby declares its intent in enacting sections 
2305.112 and 2745.01 of the Revised Code to supersede the effect of the Ohio Supreme Court 
decisions in [Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 
N.E.2d 572 (1982); Jones v. VIP Development Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1406 
(1984); Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox, 36 Ohio St. 3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489 (1988); 
Pariseau v. Wedge Products, Inc., 36 Ohio St. 3d 124, 522 N.E.2d 511 (1988); Hunter v. 
Shenago Furnace Co., 38 Ohio St. 3d 235, 527 N.E.2d 871 (1988); Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc., 59 
Ohio St. 3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108 (1991)], to the extent that the provisions of sections 
2305.112 and 2745.01 of the Revised Code are to completely and solely control all causes of 
actions not governed by Section 35 of Article II, Ohio Constitution, for physical or 
psychological conditions, or death, brought by employees or the survivors of deceased 
employees against employers.”  Act of June 27, 1995, H.B. 103, § 3, 1995 Ohio Legis. Serv. at 
L-1403 (Banks-Baldwin). 
87OHIO REV. CODE § 2745.01. 
88Johnson v. BP Chemicals Inc., 85 Ohio St. 3d 298, 707 N.E.2d 1107 (1999). 
89
“‘Victim’s talk’ in the tort arena is used not only to disavow responsibility for defective 
products, bad medicine, and unsafe practices, but to sway the public against trial lawyers in 
general. Neo-conservatives often employ the theme of a ‘culture of victimization gone wild’ to 
ridicule plaintiffs seeking compensation for mass torts. The tort reformers, for example, 
attacked the plaintiff in a landmark tobacco product liability action by arguing that she should 
have taken personal responsibility for the cancer caused by her smoking rather than blame the 
tobacco industry.” Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster, 68 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (2002). 
Neo-conservative tort reformers use the claim that runaway juries victimize corporations 
as a public relations device. The imagery of corporate victimhood advances their goal of 
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From the day they first met with their campaign treasurer and the party 
leadership, the justices of the Ohio Supreme Court have been aware of the 
extraordinary importance that tort and insurance issues have upon their careers on 
the court.  The two Republicans elected in 2002 and the new Republican appointee to 
fill the seat of soon-to-be federal circuit court of appeals judge Cook are very aware 
of the expectations that their donors and supporters have for their votes. Of course, 
each would be expected to deny any financial impact on their decisional processes.  
One can predict that the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2003 conservative majority will 
sustain the legislature’s effort at tort reform, chill the hostile rhetorical 
confrontations, and make peace. The reduction in scope of damages and value of 
claims will adversely affect the plaintiffs’ bar in Ohio. The political struggle will 
continue, but the party that controls the Ohio Legislature is now firmly in control of 
the Ohio Supreme Court. 
XIII.  A DISTANT FUTURE WITHOUT TORTS? 
The distant future probably includes abandonment of the costly and wasteful 
current tort system. I have in an earlier article forecast that administrative 
adjudication of injury claims will replace the clogged courts that now inefficiently 
process claims in the tort system.90 I predict that within fifty more years, the jury tort 
adjudication model will be replaced by a form of compensation awards system akin 
to the New Zealand approach.  The tort system’s enormous operating overhead costs 
detract from the compensatory ideal and from the redistributive model. Will it take a 
constitutional amendment to allow the state to replace jury trials with an 
administrative award system in tort cases? Probably. Is it impossible? No. Will Ohio 
tort victims be better served by the justice system when such a change occurs 
sometime in the future? Time will tell. 
                                                          
limiting corporate liabilities and cultivating popular opinion against injured claimants and 
their attorneys. 
90James T. O’Reilly, ALJs in 2050: Consequences of Merging Tort and Administrative 
Remedies, 20 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. LAW JUDGES 137 (2000). 
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